Information warfare has no rules, creating them is our next step — GFCN president

President of the Global Fact-Checking Network (GFCN) Vladimir Tabak told TASS in an interview ahead of the Dialogue about Fakes 4.0 forum about where most information attacks against Russia originate, how a disinformation campaign targeting elections to the State Duma is being prepared abroad, and which issues that are particularly sensitive to Russians are currently most vulnerable to fake news.

– Today we will be discussing a very important problem which, like a terrible disease, is capable of poisoning and replacing reality itself – fake news. And my first question to you is: which areas of Russians’ lives are being attacked by this disease first and foremost?

– It seems to me that today there are no areas that have escaped this disease. But if we are talking about the areas that are most vulnerable to it, those are everything related to security, political processes, and social issues. We know that there are currently certain fuel-related difficulties in the regions. There are also a large number of phishing websites offering fake fuel coupons, as well as unverified websites with completely bogus maps of gas stations that were created simply to collect users’ data. This is a vivid example of how a situation arising offline can prompt the creation of projects of this kind, which can then pose a fairly serious threat to citizens themselves and to the state, because systematic efforts against the country as a whole begin to take shape.

– When you hear all of this, it is hard not to feel a sense of hopelessness. Is there really nothing we can do to protect ourselves from this problem? Is there no antidote? Perhaps you could name some of the most effective methods of countering fake news?

– The situation with fake news is quite complicated today. We understand that there is a huge amount of cyber fraud. For me, even regardless of where I work, when 'a Sberbank representative' (a fake representative of Russia’s largest bank) connects you over the phone to 'an FSB representative' (a fake officer from Russia’s Federal Security Service), that is a somewhat strange situation. (This is a common scam tactic designed to gain the victim’s trust by making the call appear official – TASS). Or when an 'FSB representative' calls you on a video call, sitting in his office, and presents you with some kind of accusations.

But a huge number of people actually fall for this. On top of that, technologies are developing. There are deepfakes, for example. Today, 64% of people in surveys conducted by Dialogue Regions say that they know what deepfakes are. There were, of course, fewer of them before – 59% as of September 2025. At the same time, 80% overall say that they encounter unreliable information. What does that tell us? It tells us that we can focus exclusively on raising the population’s level of media literacy, creating an ecosystem of trust, and beyond that, it will still come down to personal responsibility, apart from situations where law enforcement agencies need to step in afterward. But at the moment when a person encounters one piece of information or another, the responsibility ultimately falls on the user.

This does not change the fact that we need to package and deliver our own information quickly and accurately. We need to be able to debunk disinformation that is spreading widely among a broad audience. In this sense, the state should not absolve itself of responsibility for, so to speak, organizing a large-scale process of informing people, debunking false information, providing education, and working with government agencies so that they, too, understand how to counter this. But given the scale at which this kind of information is being disseminated today, the only thing that can counter it on such a mass scale is a high level of media literacy and, ultimately, a basic degree of critical thinking on the part of users about what they are reading.

– The explosive growth in the amount of fake news has been driven by the development of artificial intelligence (AI). And there is currently a debate in many countries about mandatory labeling of content. Do you consider this a necessary measure? Perhaps you are in dialogue with government authorities or other organizations on this issue?

– At some point and to some extent, all countries will regulate this type of content. In fact, there are already pilot examples of countries where such content is being regulated. What is very important here is to find the right balance, because we understand that there are two opposite poles. At one end, AI helps reduce production costs and makes it possible to create content more quickly – it serves a positive function. And that function definitely should not get lost behind this bureaucratic process. At the other end, we have those same tools being deliberately used for destructive purposes. Here we need to find that delicate balance which, on the one hand, will allow legitimate content producers to continue operating in this market without unnecessary restrictions and, on the other hand, will create the right foundation for systematically countering those who use these technologies to cause harm.

But the production landscape has also changed dramatically, if we can call it that. We understand that previously, this kind of content was primarily produced by small specialized groups, those who were themselves engaged in developing artificial intelligence. Today, technologies have reached a level at which this product has become mass-market, meaning that more than 50–60 percent of AI-generated content, for example, that you see on the internet is content created by users themselves. So, to answer the question you asked, a decision to introduce content labeling is inevitable in the foreseeable future.

– In a few days, we will have an important event – elections to the State Duma. This is probably a period of particularly high vulnerability to fake news. Are you seeing preparations for a disinformation campaign coming from outside the country? Through which channels, perhaps, are they planning to spread fake news, and what narratives will they target?

– There are classic approaches to delegitimizing the electoral process. These include videos related to the voting process itself. Even without taking any particular technologies into account, this could mean, for example, using old videos. I will give the most basic example: staged videos filmed at a polling station in order to convince the viewer that what they are seeing is happening here and now. This will certainly happen; we understand that.

But there are also narratives that have nothing to do with the voting process itself – narratives intended to make this period more difficult for the authorities and for the country. And perhaps the most striking fake news story in this regard is the story about mobilization, which does not directly affect the elections. It could have an impact if mobilization were actually announced. But rumors about it undoubtedly create significant tension both among certain segments of the population and in society as a whole. And so, as you can see, even at the highest level, the Russian president addressed this issue, because the information really did spread extremely widely.

Obviously, there are opinion polls and there is analysis, but there is also a simple rule you can see in any personal chat group: if people you know start actively discussing a particular topic, then you know that topic is genuinely on people’s minds. I can say that this was discussed in every personal chat I am part of, and at every meeting I attended, someone asked a similar question. And it is clear that those who created and injected this fake news were relying on the idea that during the previous period, there was still a certain segment of people who became frightened and left, as well as the parents of those people, who were themselves under considerable stress. So, the objective pursued by our opponents is clear. I would identify this as one of the most prominent narratives we are observing.

– If it is possible to trace the source and, for example, make a list, a sort of tier list, of which countries carry out the most information attacks against Russia, what objectives are these countries pursuing?

– Ukraine is in first place, but this is fairly easy to explain. We are in a state of armed conflict, and today information warfare is part of the larger war. So, it would be strange if we were now talking about other countries dominating Ukraine in this regard. Ukraine has a separate unit, the Center for Information and Psychological Operations, or CIPsO, which is part of the regular armed forces and is classified as a military unit.

This is visible across many different issues. In other words, they get involved in any crisis-related topic and try to escalate it as much as possible and create additional tension around it. But at the same time, we understand that there are a number of countries that are also behaving quite aggressively and using specialized institutions to operate against us. First and foremost, this is Britain. This is a country that behaves quite aggressively in the information sphere. There are different methods. They have, so to speak, verified sources – media outlets and platforms that they support through various grant systems and through direct funding. There is also work involving AI, work targeting specific segments of the population, ranging from simple tactics in which certain issues are injected into the information space to more sophisticated operations.

But despite the fact that we are currently at a fairly acute stage of information confrontation, we should not discount ordinary people who often spread unreliable information without having any malicious intent. Again, this brings us back to the issue of cognitive awareness. Our task is to stop constantly saying that everything we see is somehow a product of our adversary. That is not the case. Fake news existed before. People tend, especially in situations when they feel uncertain or do not know the answers to questions that concern them, to come up with rather strange answers themselves, to put it politely, or to seek those answers in completely unverified sources. So here we need to work with the broader public so that people learn to verify information.

– So, what is needed is broad-based educational and explanatory work?

– Yes.

– Now let us talk about the association that you head. The Global Fact-Checking Network was established in 2025. Can you give us an interim assessment of this period? How has the nature of your activities, the scope of your tasks, and the scale of the network changed?

– First of all, I believe that the project has worked out overall. It is important to understand that this was initially a voluntary initiative. The project was created by us, by Russia’s News Agency TASS, and by the New Media Workshop. We created it amid the publicity surrounding our lawsuit against the FBI in the United States after we were accused of allegedly interfering in the US elections. And, to be completely honest, initially it was something of a PR move. But various industry participants from different countries showed interest, and today we have more than 125 journalists in the Association from 55 countries.

And every time at the forum (referring to the Dialogue about Fakes 4.0 forum – TASS), more and more speakers and participants from different countries attend. The total number of guests at the forum has already exceeded 2,000–3,000, including Russian participants, but a significant share still comes from different countries, including countries that are currently considered unfriendly, yet there are journalists and media professionals there who are willing to engage with us.

We have released a number of interesting and high-profile investigations, and we have developed a substantial educational program. Several memoranda have been adopted at major interna